1. In chapter 6, Hansen describes the three dominant nineteenth and early twentieth century constructions of the ‘the Balkans’. These constructions have critical importance for the two discourses that we see today (i.e. The Balkan discourse and the Genocide discourse) Can you think of other examples in which the discourse surrounding a particular area/subject changed throughout history leading to a particular construction today?
2. What are the differences between the three historical discourses that Hansen describes in terms of their spatial, temporal, and ethical identities? In what ways is the degree of “Otherness” different in each of these discourses?
3. Chapter 7 brings out how security discourse is shaped by different governments based on their national interests and foreign policy agendas and not on assessments of moral responsibilities. Do you agree? Can you give another example of a how the discourse of a war was shaped differently by different governments based on their respective national interests?
4. Hansen says that in order for a discourse to reach closure and stability, there are elements of “ambiguity, openness or blank spots” that have to be left in silence so as to maintain the stability of the discourse. Can you think of an example of a popular (stable) discourse that skipped the mention of critical instances that could have possibly changed how the discourse was formulated?
5. Hansen points out a number of problems with the humanitarian responsibility discourse. For instance, the dichotomy between “leaders” and “civilians” is problematic and it may fail to recognize the concept of “civilian agency.” According to Hansen, this discourse, among many things, is also a sort of response to media pressure. Do you think that media can influence how a discourse is shaped and recalled for years? Can you think of cases in which media reporting played a major role in forming its discourse?
6. According to the chapter, what explains the policy convergence - lift and strike - between a neorealist interpretation of the Balkan discourse and the Genocide discourse?
7. Would you agree that there is an orientalist approach in Rebecca West’s and Robert D. Kaplan’s texts and in their understandings of the Balkans? Please give a few examples to justify your position.
8. In chapter 9, Hansen writes on how the Bush Administration is criticized for staying inside the Balkan discourse by engaging in a “serious of calculated evasions”, calling the war against Bosnia “a blood feud” and “a complex, convoluted conflict that grows out of old-age animosities”. Can you think of a contemporary discourse in which a U.S. administration has used similar rhetoric? What is the foreign policy that has resulted so far from the discourse/issue you cited and is it any similar to the foreign policy generated by the U.S. during the Bosnian War; have identities been “re-articulated” during the process?
9. In what ways did the Balkan discourse differ from the Genocide discourse described in chapter 9 and why do you think this distinction is significant for understanding the West’s response to the Bosnian War? What are some of the foreign policy outcomes that were influenced by the “discursive variations” of each of the discourses?
10. In searching for a way to understand the political impact of culture, political science has drawn from other fields like economics. How does Lisa Wedeen suggest political analysis should look to understand culture and political phenomena?
2. The two basic discourses that Hansen points out are the Balkan discourse and the Genocide discourse which according to her, differ radically in there identity and create different outlooks for Western foreign policies. The Balkan discourse uses the construction of its policy making as linked through ‘Western strategic interests’ and wether they sanction intervention. On the other hand, the Genocide discourse seeks policies that would put a halt to the killings of Bosnians and Bosnian Muslims by Serbians. The degree of Otherness is described in the case of the Balkan discourse through Byronic Balkan which is seen as ‘different and admired’, the Balkan civilization discourse which is seen as ‘Different and underdevloped' and the Balkanization discourse which is seen as the ‘Radical Other and threatening’. These latter Otherness constructions are further exacerbated by a second wave which sees the Balkans as unchanging, that they since ancient times been, “uncivilized violent, hateful, and barbaric.”
ReplyDelete3. Although the Genocide discourse was prevalent in the minds of many, national interest and security were commonly discussed when it came to foreign policy setting in the case of the Bosnian war. For example, in the case of the British, the ‘national interest’ and ‘domestic responsibility’ weighed heavily “it is not a British interest, at it would only be a presence, to suppose that we can intervene and sort out every tragedy which captures people’s attention and sympathy.” (p. 125). The US saw the war in Bosnia as something that had been going on in the Balkans for 'hundreds of years’ and one that took place in a ‘far away place’ with, “..no clear American national interests and no comprehensible military strategy.” (p. 135). The US did not want to be ‘entrapped’ as it had previously in Vietnam or Beirut although there was no fear of the war spreading outside of Yugoslavia. Therefore, many in these nations, although aware of the genocide discourse did not believe that humanitarian interests or emotional outrage permitted nor justified a policy of intervening militarily. Hansen points out that the Balkan discourse allowed for Western action to take place in Bosnia, “..but these were to be carried out because there were national or Western interests are risk, not because of a moral concern for Bosnia.” (p. 125).
1)The philosopher Michel Foucault was very interesting in tracing the genealogies of discourse to see to how they changed over time. His three most famous examples are on madness, punishment, and sexuality. Through an analysis of history, he finds that “mad” people use to be roam free and sometimes were viewed as holding important perspectives on life, punishment was carried out mostly on the body and on relatively small amount of people, and sex was viewed as an art. These discourses on how to treat these subjects were present in society for long periods of history, but have shifted today. People that are labelled insane are separated from society, and few if any consider them to hold any valuable knowledge. Punishment is carried out on the mind as well as the body, and while only violent crimes used to be punished, property (amongst other crimes) crimes now carry consequences that lead to incarcerations of much larger portions of the population. I haven’t read much of Foucault’s work on sexuality, but my understanding of his argument is that while sex used to be viewed more as art, it is now medicalized and more subjected to control from those that are able to claim expert knowledge. In his works, Foucault does not necessarily want to romanticize the past discourses as better, but rather to force us to realize how dominant discourses of the day are not necessarily “natural”, and that discourse can be used as a controlling mechanism.
ReplyDelete10) Weeden refers to the study how people make apparent observable sense of the world as the study of “intelligibility”. To study intelligibility prompts questions on: semiotic activities, such as terrorism, the contexts win which they find expressions, and the irregularities they generate in the process of reproduction.
She applies her methodology to the study of Assad’s control over the Syrians. She does not study traits inherent in Syrians, but rather the rhetorical practices and symbols that encouraged obedience. While the Syrians took a cynical disbelieving approach to Assad’s overt propaganda, they obeyed none the less. In the case, fissures tensions and instabilities work together to create social order. To Weeden, intelligibility, oppositions to discourses and practices only makes sense in the signifying operations of the shared conceptual system. It was not something about Syrians per say that fostered their obedience, but rather the cultural climate created through the symbols propagated by Assad. As such, Weeden conducted a politically relevant study of Syrian culture through a study of semiotics.
10. In searching for a way to understand the political impact of culture, political science has drawn from other fields like economics. How does Lisa Weeden suggest political analysis should look to understand culture and political phenomena?
DeleteIn addition to the points you’ve raised, it is relevant to mention that Weeden encourages that culture should be looked at in wholeness while identifying the range of semiotic practices relevant to the explanations given of a political phenomenon. She also encourages that these practices should be explored on how they create, sustain and undermine disciplinary circumstances.
How certain can a researcher be that all the practices he or she has identified and chosen are relevant and that there is no hidden interpretation to some practices that could totally change the outcome of his or her conclusion?
3. Chapter 7 brings out how security discourse is shaped by different governments based on their national interests and foreign policy agendas and not on assessments of moral responsibilities. Do you agree? Can you give another example of a how the discourse of a war was shaped differently by different governments based on their respective national interests?
ReplyDeleteI do not think this statement is true for all governments. Generally, governments tend to focus on policies that are in their own best interest. Their interest may be their direct interest – security, or indirect – stability in a region that could impact the economies of surrounding countries. Western governments tend to focus more on moral obligations and a sense of humanitarianism. However, I do not think moral responsibilities are weighed more heavily than security interests. For example, The U.S. will provide aid to countries as opposed to putting troops on the ground. The aid can be used for humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts. As an example of a discourse around war, I believe there are many conflicts in Africa that were shaped differently. The U.S. may not have wanted to put troops on the ground in Darfur in 2003 due to the U.S. invading Afghanistan. However, other Western European countries stepped in to provide troops in an effort to protect civilians and stop the genocide. In this case, I believe the intervening countries had little policy or political capital to gain, it was more of a moral responsibility.
5. Hansen points out a number of problems with the humanitarian responsibility discourse. For instance, the dichotomy between “leaders” and “civilians” is problematic and it may fail to recognize the concept of “civilian agency.” According to Hansen, this discourse, among many things, is also a sort of response to media pressure. Do you think that media can influence how a discourse is shaped and recalled for years? Can you think of cases in which media reporting played a major role in forming its discourse?
Yes, the media plays a huge role in shaping the narrative of a story. The way the media covers elections provides examples as to how the media “story” guides how candidates react. If the media is reporting on how a particular candidate is lagging in the poles and they attribute it to the candidate not being aggressive or insulting his/her opponents, you will often see the candidates shift his/her tone in order to be seen as a viable candidate. With a 24 hours news cycle the media has a very large reach.
In chapter 6, Hansen describes the three dominant nineteenth and early twentieth century constructions of the ‘the Balkans’. These constructions have critical importance for the two discourses that we see today (i.e. The Balkan discourse and the Genocide discourse) Can you think of other examples in which the discourse surrounding a particular area/subject changed throughout history leading to a particular construction today?
ReplyDeleteUntil very recently, foreign policy was nonexistent in China. It's leaders closed its borders to visitors in an attempt to prioritize the country's security. It wasn't until the early 19th century, when the outside pressure grew for the country to open its doors, that China buckled to the influence of international powers. In 1986, the country famously issued a formal "Open-door policy", which allowed it to participate in and contribute to the global economy. Today, not only does China participate in the global economy, it is a major player. We hear quite a different discourse coming from Chinese leadership than we did just decades ago. Today, the country aims to be a leading power in the world, and comes pretty close. In 2015, China came in second to the US as one with the best economies in the world. I would argue that similar to the way the Balkan discourse has changed, the discourse on international political engagement has gone through many stages before getting to where it is today.
In searching for a way to understand the political impact of culture, political science has drawn from other fields like economics. How does Lisa Wedeen suggest political analysis should look to understand culture and political phenomena?
Lisa Wedeen argues that political scientists, who tend to prefer neopositive research methods, could learn from the way ethnographers use symbols to measure cultural values, norms, and beliefs. In the 1973 book The Interpretation of Cultures, Clifford Geertz "invited political scientists...to pay attention to culture as a system of symbols from which researchers could read meaning." The result was that political scientists who were influenced by Geertz emphasis on cultural symbols were more likely to appreciate the group values of the their human subjects.
1. In searching for a way to understand the political impact of culture, political science has drawn from other fields like economics. How does Lisa Wedeen suggest political analysis should look to understand culture and political phenomena?
ReplyDeleteSocial scientist must be able to know and to show that their interpretation of actions/practices of people is based on a grasp on “native intelligibility.” Intelligibility here refers to conditions that are observable rather than assumed (Wedeen 2002). It also connotes a minimalist sense of what is shared rather than a highly integrated one, which is different from common knowledge. In doing so, one should note that culture should be looked at in its wholeness—meanings are open to various and changing interpretations, while also sometimes appearing to be overly coherent, fixed, or inevitable. It is not a matter of discovery of pockets of “traditional” culture on the peripheries of societies under consideration, we should involve the recognition that diverse cultures are to be found in their own space and setting. According to Wedeen, the analyst’s task, then, may not be to specify the relationships that govern the logic or to search for hermeneutics, but rather to identify the range of semiotic practices relevant to explanations of a given political phenomenon and explore how such semiotic practices work. For instance, the way we go about analyzing ethnic identity-formation and ethnic violence by taking “culture” in context may save us from misleading conclusions. When interethnic relations are more often characterized by cooperation than conflict (Fearon & Latin (1996) cited on Wedeen 2002), analyzing the situation without imagining or “constructions” of ethnicity my bring the opposite result. Hence, Scholars should pay attention to symbols and how they create, sustain, and undermine the disciplinary circumstances through which any regime exercises power, and the very symbolic displays of power to understand the dynamics of resistance or obedience in a political arena. Moreover, “investigating semiotic practices can also help scholars to establish important criteria for differentiating passionate forms of solidarity from vague, mildly constraining experiences of “affinity and affiliation” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000 cited on Wedeen 2002, 726). Ethnography plays a great role in exploring the discontinuities paradoxes and inconsistences of culture and action.
ReplyDelete1. In chapter 6, Hansen describes the three dominant nineteenth and early twentieth century constructions of the ‘the Balkans’. These constructions have critical importance for the two discourses that we see today (i.e. The Balkan discourse and the Genocide discourse) Can you think of other examples in which the discourse surrounding a particular area/subject changed throughout history leading to a particular construction today?
A discourse that has changed in recent years is that of the “War on Drugs” in the US. From the Nixon administration on, the “War on Drugs” was seen as a national almost militaristic endeavor to abolish drug use at home and its importation from abroad. In more recent times, this effort has changed, reflected by the change in discourse. Now when issues of drug use are considered in politics, the US government is seen much more as a facilitator of help. The terminology of the “War on Drugs” is now usually employed as in the phraseology of the failure of that effort to stem what is still a problem. It is no longer an intervention brought about through force, but rather an admission that help is what is needed and not simply locking up large numbers of predominantly African American males.
5. Hansen points out a number of problems with the humanitarian responsibility discourse. For instance, the dichotomy between “leaders” and “civilians” is problematic and it may fail to recognize the concept of “civilian agency.” According to Hansen, this discourse, among many things, is also a sort of response to media pressure. Do you think that media can influence how a discourse is shaped and recalled for years? Can you think of cases in which media reporting played a major role in forming its discourse?
The media absolutely shapes discourse for years. In times prior to mass media such as TV or radio, there was less necessity to couch a nations choices and political maneuvering in a particular discourse that justified its actions. Now, media is the lens through which we view most news. An event in US politics can be viewed through a conservative or liberal lens depending on which source one gets one’s news. The media was largely responsible, in my opinion, for the legacy of President Clinton. Instead of being remembered as a great democratic president who lowered US debt and instituted many good policies, he is most famously remembered for having slept with an intern. We still largely remember him this way, as can be seen on the news so frequently dogging Hillary Clinton’s campaign. In this case, the media’s focus on his personal life instead of his accomplishments for the American people have shaped the memory of his presidency.
The contemporary discourse that one can think of that the U.S administration has used in a similar rhetoric, is the war in Iraq and it towards the ongoing civil war in Syria. The rhetoric goes, as the ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq, is an old sectarian rifts between the Islam’s sects that have been there for fourteen century. There is a failure of understanding the geopolitical interests of the regional and international powers to manipulate the identities as a force for achieving political gains.
ReplyDeleteThe invasion of Iraq has had an evident orientalistic component. The United States as a superpower has rhetoric that, it is responsible for bringing democracy to the third world e.g. moral responsibility.
One can see that the sectarian strife in the Middle East is employed as an ontological logic as in the case of the genocide representation in Bosnian war. Therefore, As Hansen in her book differentiates between the Genocide discourse and the Balkan discourse, One can argue that war in Iraq has been the Middle Eastern uniqueness discourse and then the Syrian conflict and, to certain extend, the Shia/Sunni conflict in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East as the identity conflict discourse.
Interestingly, Gutman’s report about the atrocities committed against Bosnian prisoners that included, mass executions, rape and forcing prisoners to perform sex acts to each other echoes like what was happening to Abu-Gharib Jail in Iraq.
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ReplyDeleteThere are multiple examples in which the discourse surrounding particular region / country or topic has changed over time. For example, based on our previous class discussion, we can say that in the ancient times “the Middle East” represented the region of secret riches and scientific discoveries. Then, the discourse has shifted, representing the Middle East as an underdeveloped region that justified British and French colonization. With the establishment of the State of Israel, the discourse has changed again, portraying the region as a hub for terrorist organizations. During the Arab spring, the new discourse emerged, representing the Middle East as a region “in transition.” I guess in light of the Syrian crisis, the contemporary Middle East discourse reminds me more “the Balkan” discourse, i.e. complex network of actors with irreconcilable interests driven by historic hatred and violence.
Another example when the discourse surrounding a particular country has changed over time might be Russia. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union represented a threatening ideology that had to be contained and countered worldwide. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the liberation of Eastern Europe from the Communist rule, the new Russia has been portrayed as a country “in a democratic transition”, heading toward becoming a member of a civilized Western community. In the 1990s, such a discourse was widely used by the Clinton administration to justify economic assistance to a country, which for decades used to be perceived as an enemy. With the coming of Vladimir Putin into power, a new discourse has been created, known as “Putin’s Russia.” Such discourse is very popular in Washington and it also implies that there is “another Russia” out there. Based on differentiation between “Putin’s Russia” and “that other Russia”, the USG pursues different policies, while “Putin’s Russia” needs to be countered, the “other Russia” should be supported. In light of Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine, the discourse around Russia has shifted again. Russia is portrayed as “assertive, aggressive and expansionist”. Such an image is often propagated by media outlets and it already implies certain policy choices.
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It seems to me that every single country acts based on its national interests and foreign policy agenda. However, the national interests of a country might also be interpreted as moral responsibilities. For example, in case of the U.S. intervention into Iraq, the Bush administration portrayed such an action as both moral responsibility (to destroy the axis of evil) and U.S. national interest (prevent proliferation of WMD). Often times “moral responsibility” argument is used by government officials to justify policy actions. The NATO intervention into Libya was portrayed as a “humanitarian intervention” in Western media, while the Russian government viewed it as a “regime change,” since Russia never welcomed U.S. increased presence in the regime. Same can be said about the 2014 revolution in Ukraine. While the West portrayed it as a “revolution of dignity”, people’s uprising, the Russian government saw it as a coup. And those differences can be explained by countries’ national interests in Ukraine: The West wanted to see Ukraine as a part of the Western community and work with the new government, while Russia wanted to keep it in its own sphere of influence. The following events in Ukraine were also portrayed differently; while the West called it a “Russian aggression”, as the West objected the change of borders. To Russia, it was a “support for oppressed people” in Eastern Ukraine that ensured Ukraine’s non-admission into NATO and thus supported its national interests.
In searching for a way to understand the political impact of culture, political science has drawn from other fields like economics. How does Lisa Wedeen suggest political analysis should look to understand culture and political phenomena?
ReplyDeleteCurrently a lot of discourse around political phenomena is framed as a process of culture instead of vice versa. Making a casual linkage between culture and political phenomena does not only a disservice to those being discussed but also to acknowledgement of contributing historical and contextual factors that will inevitably change the meaning of certain symbols and processes.
Wedeen explains culture as a both a semiotic process that refers to what language and symbols do but also serve as a lens to view political phenomena by focusing attention on how and why actors invest into certain symbols and give them meaning— this also attempts to include a historical context with respect o changing relations of power. Essentially culture is not fixed, even if it is a set of symbols and beliefs; these would be constantly changing because of history and constants shifts in power relations. According to Wedeen, researching dynamic semiotic processes will bring a robustness and empirically accurate analysis of culture in current political science debates.
Hansen points out a number of problems with the humanitarian responsibility discourse. For instance, the dichotomy between “leaders” and “civilians” is problematic and it may fail to recognize the concept of “civilian agency.” According to Hansen, this discourse, among many things, is also a sort of response to media pressure. Do you think that media can influence how a discourse is shaped and recalled for years? Can you think of cases in which media reporting played a major role in forming its discourse?
I definitely think media can shape discourse, even when the portrayal isn’t well grounded in fact.
I think the media has played a major role in forming the discourse around pretty much any & every minority living in this country…
Blacks, women, immigrants, “American Indians”, LGBTQ…pretty much everyone who isn’t a white man.
But just thinking back to old cowboy films and the portrayal of the “wild,wild,west”. The west was wild because it was lawless yes, but also because these American Indians (whose land was actually taken) are portrayed as barbaric people who “need” to be civilized by the white man. Without him, there is no hope.
All the way to current day, even if the media outlets don’t agree, constantly playing the hate speech and slander spoken by Donald Trump leads people to believe he will “make America great again” and not through better foreign relations but stifling of the groups that have already been historically oppressed within our country.