Objectivity, Ontology, and Epistemology: The Policy Relevance of the Ivory Tower

In light of tonight’s class, and in anticipation of next, I would like you all to reflect on a few things. Can all research findings be ‘packaged’ as policy prescriptions? And policy prescription for whom and to what end? What happens to the coveted (and, perhaps, elusive) ‘objectivity’ when we add a dimension of normative policy prescription? If we forget for a moment that in-depth IR research (as opposed to real-time policy briefs) usually takes many years to complete and issue-specific policy recommendations are very sensitive to sudden events on the ground, there is also the fact that the social realm is incredibly complex and doesn’t always lend itself to clear-cut ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ paths in specific cases. Policymakers don’t necessarily have the same normative commitments as IR scholars and interpret 'national interest' according to another set of frames beyond what a scholar might ‘know’ from his research is the ‘right’ path. But also consider this: one of the most influential schools of thought in IR (and I mean ‘influential’ in the sense that policymakers claim to be informed by it, even when they don’t really know what it means) – Structural Realism – is an extreme abstraction from reality. In other words, some of the most theoretical of IR research has also been cited as the most influential.

So, clearly, there are different levels of ‘utility’ – it makes a difference if we’re talking about policy prescription in specific cases (i.e. ‘what do to do about Syria’) or interpreting the dynamics of the ‘state system.’ Usually, when we talk about ‘policy relevance,’ it seems we mean the former. Which brings me back to the question of policy prescription for whom and to what end? You can, of course, set up a general objective (e.g. the fall of Bashar al-Assad), and suggest measures specific actors, such as the US, could take that would achieve that end. But you may also have a more complex objective (e.g. the fall of Bashar al-Assad and the transitioning of Syria into a pluralist democracy), in which case you are likely to come up with a very different set of measures that would need to be taken. Of course, the actors that would have to take those measures may not at all be as interested in the same end objective, in which case your policy prescriptions will fall on very deaf ears. 

For instance, when the Syrian uprising was still an emerging non-violent movement and scholars pointed to the importance of maintaining the non-violent character of the movement (for, you see, research has very clearly shown that the most successful transitions from dictatorship to democracy have been through non-violent movements, whereas arming rebels usually results in protracted conflict followed by another not-so-desirable regime), whereas various political actors were calling for immediate support to rebels in the form of arms. As we know, the non-violent faction lost out and although we don’t have a very clear image yet, it is clear arms have come in from the outside and we have a protracted armed conflict. The point here isn't to go into a detailed account of the Syrian conflict, but to point out that a) the social realm is fluid and complex and any policy prescriptions are inherently normative, and b) that even when clear policy prescriptions can be extracted, policymakers make their decisions based on other factors (and have different normative commitments) than the answers provided them by social scientists.

Is, then, ‘objectivity’ something scholars should strive for and, if so, how can you make policy prescriptions while maintaining your objectivity? First, we need to establish how we use the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ in the philosophical sense. In common day use, we think about someone being ‘objective’ in the sense that they don’t have an ‘agenda,’ they are not involving personal biases. Conversely, someone who is ‘subjective’ is someone who has an ‘agenda,’ they are not ‘reigning in’ their personal biases. But this is a simplification of what we are talking about in the philosophical sense – what is at stake here is whether we assume that there are facts ‘out there’ that we, with our human brains, can ‘discover’ without any process of interpretation, or if the social realm is always in need of interpretation, that what we are, in fact, doing is co-producing facts through a process of interpretation of data. In other words, it is a question of whether we understand the world to consist of objects that speak for themselves or subjects that we have co-produced through interpretation.

This is a very important distinction, because our answer to this question determines what kind of knowledge-claims we believe we can validly make about the world. The article by Jonathan Grix, which is an attempt (fairly successful, I think) to explain terms like ontology and epistemology in plain language, should be read in the light of Patrick Thaddeus Jackson’s more complex breakdown of the same concepts. Remember that these are debates that happen (or should happen) within the scholarly community and it is important to think critically about any and all readings you do for this class (and any other class, for that matter). Ontology, in its simplest definition, regards what is out there for us to study – of what does the social realm consist? Grix explains this fairly straightforward understanding of ontology, but Jackson takes it further – our understanding of the nature of the world also has implications for how we as researchers are connected to it. If we understand the world as existing independently of our interpretation, then we as researchers are external to our objects of study. But if we understand the world as being socially constructed through interpretation, then we as researchers are internal to our subjects of study. Jackson illustrates this distinction by referring to ‘scientific’ and ‘philosophical’ ontology. Scientific ontology is simply a matter of what objects and ‘things’ are out there for us to study (e.g. states, IOs etc.), whereas philosophical ontology is a matter of how we are connected to the world we study. This is not a matter of being physically connected to the world we study – it is not about whether you study your home country or community – it is a matter of whether there is such a thing as an objectively existing reality that we as researchers can ‘represent’ without shaping it through our interpretation, or whether any reality out there is inescapably a product of our interpretation.

Returning then to the issue of ‘objectivity,’ claiming objectivity (facts exist independently of our interpretation) means employing what Jackson calls a ‘dualist ontology,’ whereby the researcher is understood as completely separate from the world s/he studies (mind-world dualism). What I often hear students say is that the world needs interpretation, that facts do not exist independently of our understanding of them, but we should ‘strive to be objective.’ It should be clear by now that, from a philosophical point of view, this is an untenable position, because being ‘objective’ means no interpretation is involved in producing the facts.

The first methodological framework, Comparative Case Studies (CCS), with which we will engage next week, is quite broadly accepted as ‘mainstream’ within IR research. As you will see in the discussions in the book, this framework is, at least partially, based on the notion that the social sciences can and should emulate the logic and techniques of the natural sciences and is, in many ways, not all that different from ‘quantitative’ methodological frameworks (though there are some significant differences). While I want you to be very critical of the tendency in the social sciences to import methods from other fields, because that makes it valid ‘science,’ I don’t mean to dismiss CCS altogether. But along with Jackson, I want to bring your attention to the sometimes dogmatic ways some scholars assert that there is one scientific method and anyone who doesn’t adhere to this particular method is doing something other than science. We will be engaging with two more methodological frameworks this semester – interpretive ethnography and discourse analysis – both of which would be condemned as heretics by the Social Science Elders if the Law of the Scientific Method was adopted in the social sciences.

As I've said many times, and again echoing Jackson, the most important aspect of any scientific research is internal consistency – in any methodological framework you employ, you have to have consistency between your original assumptions about the world and your connection to it as a researcher (scientific and philosophical ontology), how you know what you know about that world (epistemology), and your techniques of data collection and analysis (your methods). Together, your philosophical assumptions and (logically consistent) plan for data collection and analysis will inform your methodology – it is the knowledge-producing machine in which you stuff your data points and facts come out the other end. In short, in order to produce good social science, you shouldn’t strive to be ‘objective’ – you should strive to be logically consistent within your methodology.

I want you all to reflect on two things until next class: 1) Should policy relevance determine your research agenda; and 2) What are your ontological and epistemological commitments? Your understanding of social reality and your connection to it is expected to evolve over time, so don’t worry about being beholden to what you say in class for the duration of the course – I simply want you to think out loud about these issues.